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Abstract: We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the
ﬁrms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the ﬁrms have
heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with diﬀerent
reservation wages and that a worker’s productivity is independent of his type.
We show that equilibrium unemployment arises in the wage-setting game
under certain conditions, although the eﬃcient allocation of workers would
result in full employment.
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1 Introduction
In the literature we can ﬁnd various micro-theoretic models of explaining
unemployment in the market, see for example, Weiss (1980), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Ma and Weiss (1993), Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) among
many others. These works have the common feature that they neglect the
strategic interaction between wage-setting ﬁrms competing for workers. In
recent papers Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000), Thisse and Zenou (2000)
and Wauthy and Zenou (2002) showed that unemployment may arise as an
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1equilibrium of an oligopsonistic wage-setting game. Hamilton, Thisse and
Zenou (2000) and Thisse and Zenou (2000) based their analysis on Salop’s
(1979) circular city. Wauthy and Zenou (2002) considered a duopsonistic
wage-setting game in which the labour force is heterogeneous with respect
to education cost and in which to work for the high-technology ﬁrm requires
more education. In this paper we present another type of wage-setting game
to explain unemployment. Our model may be regarded as an adaptation of
Bertrand-Edgeworth’s competition to the labour market.
To keep our model as simple as possible we distinguish only between two
types of workers, which diﬀer in their reservation wages. However, both types
of workers have the same productivity. Thus, the workers are vertically diﬀer-
entiated, rather than horizontally. Moreover, there is a ﬁxed ﬁnite number of
workers of each type. We assume that the two ﬁrms are heterogeneous with
respect to their productivity, but homogeneous with respect to the workers’
types. In addition, the ﬁrms have a limited number of workplaces. In this
market we will establish that under certain conditions equilibrium unem-
ployment emerges.
We have to emphasise that there are situations in real markets in which
the assumption that workers are equally productive but have diﬀerent reser-
vation wages is satisﬁed. One example would be to consider male and female
workers as the two diﬀerent types of workers. Supposing they have the same
level of education, they can be regarded as equally productive. However,
female workers may have smaller reservation wages because of possible dis-
crimination or diﬀerent opportunity cost of time. Another example would
be to distinguish between native and ethnic minority workers. Again even if
these two types of workers are equally productive, workers belonging to ethnic
minorities may have lower reservation wages due to possible discrimination.
There is some relation between the Harris and Todaro (1970) model,
which also gives us a third example satisfying our assumption of equally pro-
ductive workers with diﬀerent reservation wages, and the model presented
in this paper. The two types of workers can be interpreted as rural and ur-
ban workers. The low-productivity ﬁrm operates in the rural area while the
high-productivity ﬁrm operates in the urban area. Rural and urban workers
both satisfy equally the requirements of the ﬁrms. However, urban workers
have higher reservation wages, which may be caused by higher unemploy-
ment beneﬁts or by higher costs of living. Thus, the emerging equilibrium
unemployment results from the inﬂow of workers from the rural area into
the urban area.1 The main diﬀerence between the present model and that
1In order to maintain the diﬀerences in reservation wages in a dynamic context, one
might think of rural workers employed in the urban area as commuters.
2of Harris and Todaro (1970) lies in the wage determination process since we
have endowed the ﬁrms with strategic wage-setting power.
The equilibrium of the wage-setting game predicts to us how many work-
ers of each type will be assigned to a particular ﬁrm. In this respect our model
can be regarded as an assignment model which has the following interesting
feature: Unemployment in the market may exist though the workers have the
same productivity (skills) and the total number of jobs is equal to the total
number of workers. For an overview of assignment models in the job market
we refer to Sattinger (1993).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
formal description of our model. Section 3 analyzes the capacity-constrained
wage-setting duopsonistic game and identiﬁes those conditions under which
unemployment exists in the market. Section 4 concludes our paper. The
more technical part on the mixed-strategy equilibrium is contained in the
Appendix.
2 The framework
Our labour market will be very simple. There are two diﬀerent types of
workers denoted by ® and ¯. We assume that workers belonging to the same
type have all equal reservation wages. Let us denote these values by r® and
r¯. We shall assume that r® < r¯. Suppose that the market contains m® and
m¯ workers of type ® and ¯ respectively. For simplicity we assume that there
are only two ﬁrms denoted by A and B. We assume that, independently of
the worker’s type, a worker employed by ﬁrm A generates ½A and a worker
employed by ﬁrm B generates ½B revenue. This assumption means that the
ﬁrms do not care which type of worker they employ. We assume that ﬁrm
B has a higher productivity, that is, ½B > ½A. In addition, we assume that
r® · ½A and r¯ · ½B, which implies that both types of workers can generate
a surplus at a certain ﬁrm. Suppose that the ﬁrms have a limited number of
workplaces denoted by nA and nB. The wages set by the ﬁrms are wA and
wB. We say that there is unemployment in the market, if there are workers
who have reservation wages less or equal to the higher wage oﬀer, and did not
get a job in the market speciﬁed in the remainder of this section. Since we do
not want to consider ‘structural’ unemployment, we assume that m® = nA
and m¯ = nB. Under these circumstances an eﬃcient allocation of workers
would be if all ®-type workers were assigned to ﬁrm A at wage r® and all
¯-type workers were assigned to ﬁrm B at wage r¯.
We will consider the following wage-setting game: First, the ﬁrms make a
wage oﬀer. Next, the workers are trying to get a job with the ﬁrm making the
3higher wage oﬀer if the oﬀer exceeds or equals their reservation wages. If there
are no more vacancies at the high-wage ﬁrm, the workers turn to the ﬁrm
with the lower wage oﬀer. We have to specify the strategic game describing
the situation in the market. Let the ﬁrms’ strategy sets be WA := [0;1)
and WB := [0;1) respectively. Clearly, nobody will apply at a ﬁrm setting
a wage lower than r®. It is also obvious that a ﬁrm setting a wage greater
or equal to r¯ can ﬁll all its workplaces since even if its opponent is setting
a higher wage, the workers not obtaining a job with the high-wage ﬁrm will
apply to the low-wage ﬁrm.
If at least one ﬁrm picks a wage from the interval [r®;r¯) and the other
ﬁrm from the interval [0;r¯), then only ®-type workers will apply. Moreover,
if they set the same wage, we assume that the two ﬁrms share in expected
value the ®-type workers in proportion to the size of their workplaces. If ﬁrm
A sets the higher wage, then it will employ all the ®-type workers, while if
ﬁrm B sets the higher wage, it will employ minfm®;m¯g workers.
Suppose that ﬁrm B sets a wage greater or equal to r¯ and that ﬁrm A
sets a wage in [r®;r¯). We assume that the number of ®-type workers em-
ployed by ﬁrm B is determined through a random sample. In particular, each
worker obtains a lottery ticket and m¯ tickets are drawn (without replace-
ment) out of an urn ﬁlled with m®+m¯ tickets. This means that the number
of ®-type workers employed at ﬁrm B, henceforth denoted by X, has a hy-
pergeometric distribution. Hence, the probability of hiring k 2 f0;1;:::;m¯g
®-type workers equals









It is also reasonable to assume that the number of ®-type workers employed at
ﬁrm B is hypergeometrically distributed if both types of workers are equally
eager and able to obtain a job with the high-wage ﬁrm B. Note that we have
unemployment in the market with the exception of the low probability event
that X = 0, because ¯-type workers will not apply for a job with ﬁrm A.
Expected unemployment EX will be m¯
m®
m®+m¯.
In a similar way as in the previous paragraph we can determine the ex-
pected proﬁts of the ﬁrms for the case when ﬁrm A sets a wage greater or
equal to r¯ and ﬁrm B sets a wage in [r®;r¯). We assume that the number of
®-type workers employed by ﬁrm A, denoted by Y , is determined through a
random sample of size m®, where the sampling is done without replacement
from an urn containing m®+m¯ workers. Then Y has also a hypergeometric
distribution, i.e., the probability of hiring k 2 f0;1;:::;m®g ®-type workers
4by ﬁrm A equals









Now we have unemployment in the market with the exception of the low
probability event that m® ¡ Y = m¯, because ¯-type workers will not ap-
ply for a job with ﬁrm B. Note that Pr(m® ¡ Y > m¯) = 0 and expected
unemployment equals m¯ ¡ (m® ¡ EY ) = m¯
m¯
m®+m¯.
Summarizing the cases described in the preceding paragraphs, ﬁrm A has
an expected proﬁt function E¼A (wA;wB) :=
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
(½A ¡ wA)m®; if wA ¸ r¯;
(½A ¡ wA)m®
m®
m®+m¯; if wA 2 [r®;r¯) and wB ¸ r¯;
(½A ¡ wA)maxfm® ¡ m¯;0g; if wA;wB 2 [r®;r¯) and wA < wB;
(½A ¡ wA)m®
m®
m®+m¯; if wA;wB 2 [r®;r¯) and wA = wB;
(½A ¡ wA)m®; if wA 2 [r®;r¯) and wA > wB;
0; if wA < r®:
and ﬁrm B has expected proﬁt function E¼B (wA;wB) :=
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
(½B ¡ wB)m¯; if wB ¸ r¯;
(½B ¡ wB)m®
m¯
m®+m¯; if wB 2 [r®;r¯) and wA ¸ r¯;
0; if wA;wB 2 [r®;r¯) and wA > wB;
(½B ¡ wB)m®
m¯
m®+m¯; if wA;wB 2 [r®;r¯) and wA = wB;
(½B ¡ wB)minfm®;m¯g; if wB 2 [r®;r¯) and wA < wB;
0; if wB < r®:
Assuming that the ﬁrms are risk neutral, they will play game
Γ := hfA;Bg;(WA;WB);(E¼A;E¼B)i:
Notice that we have not included the workers themselves as strategic players,
but we have included their behaviour in the speciﬁcation of (E¼A;E¼B).
3 The equilibrium of the wage-setting game
Our aim is to determine the equilibrium of game Γ and those conditions in
the market under which unemployment exists. First, we investigate the case
in which ﬁrm A’s productivity allows ﬁrm A to make proﬁts even through
5hiring ¯-type workers, that is, in the following we shall assume ½A > r¯.
Supposing that ﬁrm B sets wage r¯ we shall denote by w¤
A the wage at which
ﬁrm A is indiﬀerent to whether it sets wage r¯ or w¤
A 2 (¡1;r¯) , that is,
w¤
A is the solution of equation






By solving this equation we obtain that w¤
A = 1
m® (r¯ (m® + m¯) ¡ ½Am¯).
Clearly, w¤
A may be even less than r®, but we allow this to simplify our
analysis. In an analogous way we deﬁne the value w¤
B 2 (¡1;r¯) as the
solution of equation






which results in w¤
B = 1
m® (r¯ (m® + m¯) ¡ ½Bm¯). Observe that we have
r¯ > w¤
A > w¤
B because of ½B > ½A > r¯.
The following proposition describes the outcome of game Γ in case of
½A > r¯.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ½A > r¯. Then in game Γ we have the following
cases:
1. If w¤
A < r®, then the unique equilibrium equals (wA;wB) = (r¯;r¯) and
there is no unemployment.
2. If w¤
A > r® and w¤
B · r®, then the unique equilibrium equals (wA;wB) =




A = r®, then (wA;wB) = (r®;r¯) and (wA;wB) = (r¯;r¯) are both
equilibria.
4. If w¤
B > r®, then an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
Proof. First, observe that neither of the two ﬁrms will set a wage above r¯.
In addition, any wage below r® is dominated by wage r¯. A strategy proﬁle
(wA;wB) 2 [r®;r¯) £ [r®;r¯) cannot be an equilibrium proﬁle because; if
wA = wB, then both ﬁrms have the incentive to unilaterally increase their
wages slightly, and if wA 6= wB, then the ﬁrm setting the higher wage can
increase its proﬁt by reducing its wage slightly. Hence, in an equilibrium at
least one ﬁrm has to set wage r¯.
Case (1): Suppose that w¤
A < r®. We already know that at least one ﬁrm,
say ﬁrm A, sets wage r¯. Then from w¤
B < r® it follows that every wage
6wB 2 [r®;r¯) is dominated by wage r¯. The same argument can be repeated
if we assume that ﬁrm B sets wage r¯.
Cases (2) and (3): We will split our analysis into two subcases: (i) w¤
B < r®
and (ii) w¤
B = r®. We start with (i). Suppose that w¤
A ¸ r® and w¤
B < r®. We
know that in a possible equilibrium at least one ﬁrm sets wage r¯. If wA = r¯,
then wB = r¯ follows since ﬁrm B realizes less proﬁt by setting a wage below
r¯ than by setting wage r¯. However, if wB = r¯, then wage r® is a best
reply for ﬁrm A because E¼A (r®;r¯) ¸ E¼A (w¤
A;r¯) = E¼A (r¯;r¯). In ad-
dition, E¼B (r®;r¯) = E¼B (r¯;r¯) > E¼B (r¯;r®) = E¼B (r®;r®). Thus,
(wA;wB) = (r®;r¯) is an equilibrium. Observe that (wA;wB) = (r¯;r¯)
is another equilibrium if w¤
A = r®. Now we turn to subcase (ii). Sup-
pose that wB = r¯. But then ﬁrm A sets wage r® since E¼A (r¯;r¯) =
E¼A (w¤
A;r¯) < E¼A (r®;r¯) because w¤
B = r® implies w¤
A > r®. We ob-
tain that (r®;r¯) is an equilibrium strategy proﬁle since E¼B (r®;r¯) =
E¼B (r¯;r¯) = E¼B (r¯;r®) = E¼B (r®;r®). Now suppose that wA = r¯. But
then ﬁrm B has two best replies: wB = r¯ and wB = r®, where in the ﬁrst
case (r¯;r¯) cannot be an equilibrium strategy proﬁle since ﬁrm A would
deviate to wage r®. Consider the second possibility of wB = r®. However,
this is in contradiction with wA = r¯ being an equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm A
since E¼A (r¯;r®) = E¼A (r¯;r¯) = E¼A (w¤
A;r¯) < E¼A (w¤
A;r®). Thus, we
conclude that (r®;r¯) is the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle in subcase
(ii).
Case (4): Suppose that w¤
B > r®. As was shown in the ﬁrst paragraph
of this proof, in an eventual pure-strategy equilibrium at least one ﬁrm has
to set wage r¯. Suppose that wA = r¯. But then ﬁrm B sets wage r® since
E¼B (r¯;r¯) = E¼B (r¯;w¤
B) < E¼B (r¯;r®). However, this is in contradiction
with wA = r¯ being an equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm A since E¼A (r¯;r®) =
E¼A (r¯;r¯) = E¼A (w¤
A;r¯) < E¼A (w¤
A;r®). The same argumentation can
be repeated if we assume that wB = r¯. Hence, we conclude that a pure-
strategy equilibrium does not exist.
In case (1) of Proposition 1 wage r® is high enough to prevent the ﬁrms
from setting low wages. Therefore, we have full employment in the market.
Let us remark that in the full employment case ®-type workers may be em-
ployed by ﬁrm B and ¯-type workers may be employed by ﬁrm A.
Case (2) of Proposition 1 occurs if only ﬁrm B does not strictly prefer
setting wage r® to r¯ whenever its opponent sets wage r¯. In this case ﬁrm B
has no vacancies but ﬁrm A cannot ﬁnd enough workers since ¯-type workers
will not apply to ﬁrm A and only those ®-type workers will apply to ﬁrm
A who could not obtain a job with ﬁrm B. Hence, all ®-type workers get
employed and there are ¯-type workers seeking for a job with ﬁrm B. In par-
7ticular, we can expect that m¯
m®
m®+m¯ ¯-type workers will not get a job. Thus,
unemployment exists in the market, which arises because of the ineﬃcient al-
location of workers to ﬁrm B. All workers apply ﬁrst to the high-wage ﬁrm B
and workers are hired through a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-employed mechanism, where
each order of arrival is assumed to be equally probable.2 Unemployment is
caused by a mismatching between ﬁrms and workers. However, there is a
serious reason why we have to worry about matching workers with ﬁrms; in
particular, the high-wage ﬁrm cannot employ all the workers who want to be
employed with the high-wage ﬁrm, since the ﬁrm has only a limited number
of workplaces. Hence, competition is relaxed by the introduction of capac-
ity constraints, as is usually the case in Bertrand-Edgeworth type games.
Among other reasons this makes our model behave diﬀerently from Waughty
and Zenou (2002).
Unemployment could also be explained by a lack of coordination between
ﬁrms. However, to avoid the emerging unemployment ﬁrm B has to introduce
a diﬀerent selection procedure. Clearly, ﬁrm B has no incentive to employ a
diﬀerent kind of selection procedure, since this might imply additional costs.
Hence, one cannot expect that this type of unemployment disappears if the
game is repeated inﬁnitely.
Now turning to case (3) we can observe that either case (1) or case (2)
emerges. Finally, case (4) of Proposition 1 occurs if both ﬁrms set wage
r® whenever they believe that their opponent sets wage r¯. Unfortunately,
in this case an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. However, in a
mixed-strategy equilibrium a non-eﬃcient assignment will arise with positive
probability, that is, either there will be unemployed ¯-type workers or ¯-type
workers will not apply for a job at all, since (r¯;r¯) cannot be an equilibrium
in pure strategies and (r¯;r¯) is the only undominated outcome leading to
an eﬃcient assignment of workers. The mixed-strategy equilibrium can be
found in the Appendix.
We still have to investigate the case of ½A · r¯. Clearly, if even ½A < r¯,
the workers will not be assigned to the ﬁrms eﬃciently, since even if ﬁrm B
sets wage r¯, ®-type workers will be employed by ﬁrm B with the exception
of the low-probability event of X = 0.
The following proposition determines the Nash equilibrium of the
capacity-constrained wage-setting game Γ for the case of ½A · r¯.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ½A · r¯. Then in game Γ we have the following
cases:
2This results in the expected assignment of ®-type workers to ﬁrm B described in
Section 2.
81. If E¼B (r®;r¯) ¸ E¼B (0;r®), then the unique equilibrium is (r®;r¯)
and expected unemployment equals m¯
m®
m®+m¯.
2. If E¼B (r®;r¯) < E¼B (0;r®), then an equilibrium in pure strategies
does not exist.
Proof. Clearly, ﬁrm A will never set its wage above ½A while ﬁrm B will
never set its wage above r¯. In addition, any wage below r® is dominated by
wage r¯ for ﬁrm B and at least weakly dominated by wage r® for ﬁrm A.
First, suppose that ½A < r¯. Then a strategy proﬁle (wA;wB) 2 [r®;½A]£
[r®;½A] cannot be an equilibrium proﬁle because; if wA = wB, then at least
ﬁrm B has the incentive to unilaterally increase its wage slightly, and if
wA 6= wB, then the ﬁrm setting the higher wage can increase its proﬁt by
reducing its wage. Hence, in a possible pure-strategy equilibrium ﬁrm B has
to set its wage in (½A;r¯]. However, a strategy wB 2 (½A;r¯) cannot be an
equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm B since E¼B (wA;wB) is strictly decreasing on
(½A;r¯) in wB for any ﬁxed wA 2 [0;½A]. Thus, in a possible pure-strategy
equilibrium ﬁrm B has to set wage r¯. This implies that ﬁrm A has to set
wage r®.
Second, in case of ½A = r¯ strategy proﬁle (r¯;r¯) cannot be an equilib-
rium proﬁle since then E¼A (r¯;r¯) = 0, while E¼A (r®;r¯) > 0. Through
repeating the argumentation of the previous paragraph one can show that
a strategy proﬁle (wA;wB) 2 [r®;½A) £ [r®;½A) cannot be an equilibrium
proﬁle. Hence, we obtain that proﬁle (r®;r¯) is the only one which can still
be a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Finally, we have to determine the condition under which (r®;r¯) is a Nash
equilibrium. First, it can be easily checked that E¼A (r®;r¯) ¸ E¼A (wA;r¯)
for all wA 2 WA. Second, we need E¼B (r®;r¯) ¸ E¼B (r®;wB) for all wB 2
WB. Taking into consideration that E¼B (r®;wB) is strictly decreasing on
(r®;r¯) in wB we obtain that
E¼B (r®;r¯) ¸ lim
wB&r®
E¼B (r®;wB) = E¼B (0;r®)
is a suﬃcient condition for (r®;r¯) being a Nash equilibrium. In addition,
if E¼B (r®;r¯) < E¼B (0;r®), there exists a suﬃciently small " > 0 such
that E¼B (r®;r¯) < E¼B (r®;r® + "). We conclude that E¼B (r®;r¯) ¸
E¼B (0;r®) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for (r®;r¯) being a Nash
equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
Condition E¼B (r®;r¯) ¸ E¼B (0;r®) is equivalent to
m¯ (½B ¡ r¯) ¸ minfm®;m¯g(½B ¡ r®):
9Thus, clearly m¯ > m® is a necessary condition for E¼B (r®;r¯) ¸
E¼B (0;r®). Moreover, if m¯ is increased suﬃciently while m®, r®, r¯, ½A
and ½B are kept ﬁxed, then (r®;r¯) will become a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Although in case (2) of Proposition 2 we did not determine the outcome
of game Γ we know that an eﬃcient outcome with full employment is not
possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, since ﬁrm A will never set a wage
above ½A. Thus, if ½A < r¯, we have either unemployment with vacancies
at ﬁrm A and unemployed ¯-type workers, or a total of m¯ vacancies and
¯-type workers will not apply for a job.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered a wage-setting duopsonistic game in which the
ﬁrms diﬀer in their productivity and the workers in their reservation wages.
To simplify the analysis we assumed that there are only two ﬁrms and two
possible levels of reservation wages. It would be interesting to determine the
outcome of a more general setting with n ﬁrms in the market and m diﬀerent
levels of reservation wages. However, the number of cases to be investigated
increases rapidly as m or n increases and therefore, this generalization would
take much space.
Under certain conditions we pointed out the existence of unemployment
(Propositions 1 and 2). In particular, unemployment emerges because ®-
type workers may occupy better paid jobs, which would be acceptable even
for ¯-type workers. Thus, we explain unemployment through a non-eﬃcient
assignment of workers to ﬁrms. An interesting feature of the model is that
unemployment may emerge although the workers have the same productivity
(skills). In addition, in case of unemployment there are also unﬁlled vacan-
cies at the ﬁrm setting the lower wage. The coexistence of unemployment
and unﬁlled vacancies has been demonstrated, for example, by Gottfries and
McCormick (1995) in a diﬀerent setting.
To demonstrate the existence of unemployment in our job market we
have applied random rationing of ®-type workers. This resulted in the appli-
cation of the input market equivalent of the so-called random rationing rule
(at least in expected value), which is well-known in the literature of price-
setting games in output markets. We refer to Vives (1999) for a description
of rationing rules in product markets.
An appealing way to resolve the assumption of equally productive workers
would be to consider a model like Wauthy and Zenou (2002). In particular,
consider the ®-type workers as low-skilled workers and the ¯-type workers as
high-skilled workers. Now suppose that ®-type workers face education costs
10EA
® and EB
® if they want to work for ﬁrms A and B respectively. Deﬁne EA
¯
and EB
¯ in an analogous way. Given that the ®-type workers are the low-









¯ . Now even if we
maintain our assumptions imposed on the number of workers and workplaces
(that is, m® = nA and m¯ = nB), it can be veriﬁed that there is a range
of parameter values such that we have full employment and the ﬁrms set
diﬀerent wages in contrast to Proposition 1. A more complete analysis of
this modiﬁed model deserves attention in future research.
Appendix
In the Appendix we consider case (4) of Proposition 1 in detail. We know that
in this case an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist and we start with
pointing out that we cannot apply the existence theorems on games with dis-
continuous payoﬀs established by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon (1987)
and Reny (1999) for all parameter values. To verify this latter statement we
can restrict ourselves to Reny’s (1999) Corollary 5.2, since the other exis-
tence theorems on discontinuous games all follow from Reny’s corollary. In
particular, for the case of m® · m¯ we will check that the mixed extension of
Γ0 := hfA;Bg;[0;½B]2;(E¼A;E¼B)i is not better-reply secure at (r¯;r¯).3 It
can be easily veriﬁed that game Γ0 itself is not better-reply secure at (r¯;r¯),
since ﬁrm i 2 fA;Bg could only increase its proﬁt by setting a wage below
w¤
i. Now if ﬁrm i’s opponent reduces its wage slightly, then ﬁrm i makes zero
proﬁt. Hence, ﬁrm i cannot secure payoﬀs higher than E¼i (r¯;r¯). However,
we have to show that the mixed extension of Γ0 is not better-reply secure
at the proﬁle in which both ﬁrms are setting wage r¯ with probability one.
Suppose that ﬁrm i deviates by playing a mixed strategy resulting in higher
payoﬀs than E¼i (r¯;r¯). Now if its opponent sets wage r¯ ¡ " with prob-
ability one, where " is suﬃciently small, then ﬁrm i makes less proﬁt than
E¼i (r¯;r¯), since it could only have slightly higher proﬁt with a very low
probability while it makes zero proﬁt with a very large probability.
In the following a mixed strategy is a probability measure deﬁned on the
¾-algebra of Borel measurable sets on [0;r¯]. A mixed-strategy equilibrium
(¹A;¹B) is determined by the following two conditions:
E¼A (wA;¹B) · ¼
¤
A; E¼B (¹A;wB) · ¼
¤
B (1)
3Game Γ0 is better-reply secure if whenever (w¤;E¼¤) is in the closure of the graph of
its vector payoﬀ function and w¤ is not an equilibrium proﬁle, then there exist an " > 0,




















11holds true for all wA;wB 2 [0;r¯], and
E¼A (wA;¹B) = ¼
¤
A; E¼B (¹A;wB) = ¼
¤
B (2)
holds true ¹A-almost everywhere and ¹B-almost everywhere, where ¼¤
A;¼¤
B
stand for the equilibrium proﬁts corresponding to (¹A;¹B). We shall denote
the distribution functions associated with ¹A and ¹B by FA and FB, respec-
tively.4
We start with the case of m® · m¯. Throughout the proofs it will be
helpful to rewrite assumption w¤
B > r® in form of r¯ (m® + m¯) > ½Bm¯ +
r®m® or
m® (r¯ ¡ r®) > m¯ (½B ¡ r¯): (3)
For the case of m® · m¯ we can have two diﬀerent types of equilibria. The
ﬁrst one is described by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. If ½A > r¯, w¤
B > r®, m® · m¯ and
(½B ¡ r¯)m¯ µ












; w = ½A ¡
(½A ¡ r®)(½A ¡ r¯)m®
(½A ¡ r®)m® ¡ (½A ¡ r¯)m¯
;


































¹B (fr¯g) for all w 2 (r®;w]
is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the corresponding equilibrium
proﬁts equal ¼¤
A = (½A ¡ r¯)m® and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ r¯)m¯.
4We follow the convention that the distribution functions are left-continuous. Hence,
FA (w) = ¹A ([0;w)) and FB (w) = ¹B ([0;w)) for all w 2 [0;r¯].
12Proof. It is straightforward to check that w > r® follows from w¤
B > r®, while
w < r¯ follows from ½A > r¯. Hence, w 2 (r®;r¯). In addition, w¤
B > r®,
implies ¹B (fr¯g) < 1. Obviously, 0 < ¹B (fr¯g). Observe that condition (4)
is equivalent to ¹A (fr¯g) > 0. Of course, FA and FB are both increasing
in w on 2 (r®;w]. In addition, one can check that ¹A (fr¯g) = 1 ¡ FA (w),
¹B (fr¯g) = 1 ¡ FB (w), ¹A (fr®g) = limw&r® FA (w), limw&r® FB (w) = 0,
¼
¤











for all w 2 (r®;w]. From the equations above one immediately sees that
setting wages w 2 (w;r¯) result in lower proﬁts, since
¼
¤











for all w 2 (w;r¯).
We still have to verify whether 0 < ¹A (fr®g) < 1 and ¹A (fr¯g) <
1. Observe that we have ¹A (fr®g) + ¹A (fr¯g) < 1 by ¹A (fr®g) =
limw&r® FA (w) < FA (w) = 1 ¡ ¹A (fr¯g). Hence, it is suﬃcient to establish
0 < ¹A (fr®g), which turns out to be the least obvious case, so we include











































































13We increase the right hand side by employing (3), and we show that this




























Now carrying out the necessary simpliﬁcations and rearrangements one
obtains
(½B ¡ r®)m®m¯ ¡ (r¯ ¡ r®)m
2
® > (½A ¡ r¯)m
2
¯: (7)
To verify that equation (7) is indeed satisﬁed, ﬁrst we check that even if we
have m® (r¯ ¡ r®) = m¯ (½B ¡ r¯), then (7) is fulﬁlled; and second we check



















Hence, ¹A and ¹B are indeed probability measures and therefore, the ﬁrms’
proﬁts equal ¼¤
A = (½A ¡ r¯)m® and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ r¯)m¯. Now we can get the
stated formulas for FA and FB by simply rearranging equations (6) and (5),
respectively, which completes the proof.
The following Proposition considers the other possible equilibrium that
might arise in case of m® · m¯.
Proposition 4. Suppose that ½A > r¯, w¤
B > r®, m® · m¯ and
(½B ¡ r¯)m¯ µ






Then (¹A;¹B) given by
¹B (fr®g) = 0; w =
1
m®
(½Bm® ¡ ½Bm¯ + r¯m¯) 2 (r®;r¯];






















¹B (fr¯g) for all w 2 (r®;w]
14is an equilibrium in mixed strategies with ¼¤




B = (½B ¡ r¯)m¯.
Proof. Of course, 0 < ¹A (fr®g) and it is not diﬃcult to verify that
¹A (fr®g) < 1 by w¤
B > r® and ½B > r¯. One can check easily that
w > r® follows from w¤
B > r® and that w · r¯ follows from ½B > r¯.
In addition, we can have w = r¯ only if m® = m¯. Thus, we also must
have 0 < ¹B (fr¯g) < 1. Clearly, FA and FB are both increasing in w
on 2 (r®;w]. Moreover, by simple calculations one obtains FA (w) = 1,
¹B (fr¯g) = 1 ¡ FB (w), ¹A (fr®g) = limw&r® FA (w), limw&r® FB (w) = 0,
¼
¤







B = (½B ¡ w)m®FA(w) (10)
for all w 2 (r®;w]. Clearly, setting wages w 2 (w;r¯) result in lower proﬁts.




m®+m¯¹B (fr¯g) and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ r¯)m¯. Therefore, and by the
equations (9) and (10) we can determine FB and FA.
We still must verify whether ﬁrm A could gain from setting wage r¯.
In fact, as it can be veriﬁed, this cannot be the case, since condition (8) is
equivalent to ¼¤
A ¸ (½A ¡ r¯)m®, which completes the proof.
Now we turn to the case of m® > m¯. For this case we also have two
diﬀerent types of equilibria.
Proposition 5. If ½A > r¯, w¤
B > r®, m® > m¯ and
(½A ¡ r®)m¯ > (r¯ ¡ r®)m®; (11)













¹B (fr®g) = 0; w = ½A ¡
(½A ¡ r®)(½A ¡ r¯)m¯
(r¯ ¡ r®)m®






























for all w 2 (r®;w];
15where ¼¤
A = (½A ¡ r¯)m® and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ r¯)m¯.
Proof. Now r® < w follows from w¤
B > r® and ½A > r¯, while w < r¯ follows
from condition (11). Hence, ¹A (fr¯g) > 0. By carrying out the necessary re-
arrangements it can be checked that ¹B (fr¯g) > 0 is equivalent to condition
(11). In addition, ¹B (fr¯g) < 1 just follows from w¤
B > r®. Clearly, FA and
FB are both increasing in w on 2 (r®;w]. Furthermore, one can check that
¹A (fr¯g) = 1¡FA (w), ¹B (fr¯g) = 1¡FB (w), ¹A (fr®g) = limw&r® FA (w),
limw&r® FB (w) = 0,
¼
¤
A = (½A ¡ w)
µ


















for all w 2 (r®;w]. From ¹A ([w;r¯)) = 0, ¹B ([w;r¯)) = 0, (12) and (13) we
can see that setting wages w 2 (w;r¯) result in lower proﬁts.
We still have to verify that ¹A (fr¯g) < 1 and 0 < ¹A (fr®g) < 1.
Observe that since we have ¹A (fr®g) + ¹A (fr¯g) < 1 by ¹A (fr®g) =
limw&r® FA (w) < FA (w) = 1 ¡ ¹A (fr¯g), it suﬃces to check ¹A (fr®g) > 0.
However, verifying this inequality is not straightforward, so we include here
some steps of the following calculations. Again, it will be helpful to employ
w¤
B > r® in form of (3). Now, 0 < ¹A (fr®g) is equivalent to
(½B ¡ r®)m®


























































































16We decrease the left hand side by employing (3) and ½B > ½A, and we
show that this decreased expression is still larger than the right hand side.




























Now carrying out the necessary simpliﬁcations and rearrangements one
obtains
(½A ¡ r®)m®m¯ ¡ (r¯ ¡ r®)m
2
® < (½B ¡ r¯)m
2
¯: (14)
To verify (14), ﬁrst it can be checked that even if we have m® (r¯ ¡ r®) =
m¯ (½B ¡ r¯), then (14) is satisﬁed; and second it can be checked that an



















Thus, ¹A and ¹B are indeed probability measures. Hence, ¼¤
A = (½A ¡ r¯)m®
and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ r¯)m¯. Now one can obtain the stated expressions for FB
and FA in the Proposition by rearranging (12) and (13), respectively, and we
are done.
Finally, we have to consider the other possible equilibrium that might
arise in case of m® > m¯.
Proposition 6. Assume that ½A > r¯, w¤
B > r®, m® > m¯ and
(½A ¡ r®)m¯ · (r¯ ¡ r®)m®: (15)
Then (¹A;¹B) given by
¹B (fr®g) = 0; w =
1
m®
(½Am¯ + r®m® ¡ r®m¯);
















+ 1 for all w 2 (r®;w]
is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the equilibrium proﬁts equal
¼¤
A = (½A ¡ w)m® and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ w)m¯.
17Proof. One can check easily that ½A > r® implies w > r®, while (15) is
equivalent to w · r¯. Therefore, it follows that 0 < ¹A (fr®g) < 1. Obviously,
FA and FB are both increasing in w on 2 (r®;w]. One immediately sees that
limw%w FA (w) = 1, limw%w FB (w) = 1 and ¹A (fr®g) = limw&r® FA (w). In
addition, by simple calculations one obtains limw&r® FB (w) = 0,
¼
¤




B = (½B ¡ w)m¯FA(w) (17)
for all w 2 (r®;w]. Obviously, the equations above imply that setting wages
w 2 (w;r¯) result in lower proﬁts. The ﬁrms’ proﬁts equal ¼¤
A = (½A ¡ w)m®
and ¼¤
B = (½B ¡ w)m¯. Thus, we can express FA and FB from (17) and (16),
respectively.
It still could happen that ﬁrm A gains from setting wage r¯. However,
as can be veriﬁed, this cannot happen, since condition (15) is equivalent to
¼¤
A ¸ (½A ¡ r¯)m®, which completes the proof.
Propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide a complete mixed-strategy solution for
case (4) of Proposition 1. Moreover, this equilibrium is a unique one, however,
we omit here the very tedious calculations demonstrating uniqueness.5
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19Additional calculations (not intended for pub-
lication)
The following proposition points out how we derived the equilibrium in mixed
strategies contained in the Appendix, and why this equilibrium is unique. In
particular, we can make the following statement about the form of the mixed-
strategy equilibrium if there exist such at all.
Proposition 7. Assume that ½A > r¯ and w¤
B > r®. If (¹A;¹B) is a mixed-
strategy equilibrium of Γ, then there exists a wage w 2 (r®;r¯] such that

























for all w 2 (r®;w], where ¼¤
A;¼¤
B stand for the equilibrium proﬁts correspond-
ing to (¹A;¹B).
Proof. Assume that (¹A;¹B) is an equilibrium in mixed strategies. We shall
denote the supremum of wages smaller than r¯ that might be set by ﬁrm
i 2 fA;Bg by wi := inf fw 2 [0;r¯] j ¹i ([w;r¯)) = 0g. In an analogous way
we deﬁne the inﬁmum of wages that might be set by ﬁrm i 2 fA;Bg by
wi := supfw 2 [0;r¯] j ¹i ([0;w)) = 0g.
Step 1: Both ﬁrms cannot have atoms at the same wage w 2 [0;r¯), that
is, ¹A (fwg) = 0 or ¹B (fwg) = 0 for all w 2 [0;r¯). If this is not the case,
then both ﬁrms could increase their proﬁts by switching unilaterally to pure
strategy w +", where " is a suﬃciently small positive value; a contradiction.
Step 2: We show that wA = wB = r®. Clearly, wA < r¯ and wB < r¯.
Suppose that wA < wB. Then we must have ¹A ((wA;wB)) = 0 and
¹A (fwAg) > 0. By Step 1 we know that only one of the two ﬁrms can
have an atom at wB. If only ﬁrm A has an atom at wB, then it will make
higher proﬁts by setting a wage w 2 (wA;wB) instead of setting wage wB,
a contradiciton. The same would hold true for ﬁrm B if only ﬁrm B had
an atom at wage wB. Hence, we must have wA ¸ wB. In an analogous way
we can show that wB ¸ wA. Thus, wA = wB. Henceforth we can write
w := wA = wB. Now if r® < w, then Step 1 and w¤
B > r® imply that at least
one ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt by setting wage r®; a contradiciton.
20Step 3: We must have wA = wB. Suppose that wA < wB < r¯. But then in
contradiction with (¹A;¹B) being an equilibrium proﬁle, ﬁrm B would make
higher proﬁt by switching to pure strategy wA + ", where " is a suﬃciently
small positive value. Obviously, for similar reasons we cannot have wB <
wA < r¯. Hence, wA = wB whenever wA < r¯. Now if, for instance, wA <
wB = r¯ is the case, then ﬁrm B can gain from playing a wage wB 2 (wA;r¯)
with probability ¹B ([wB;r¯)) instead of having the same mass distributed
over the interval [wB;r¯). Again for similar reasons we cannot have wB <
wA = r¯. Thus, wA = wB in any case.
Step 4: There are no atoms in (r®;w). Suppose ﬁrm A has an atom at wA 2
(r®;w). Then ﬁrm B certainly will not set a wage in interval (wA ¡ ";wA),
where " is a suﬃciently small positive value, since even wage wA for ﬁrm B
would dominate wages in (wA ¡";wA). Therefore, ﬁrm A could do better by
setting some wage slightly below wA because ﬁrm B does not have an atom
at wage wA by Step 1; a contradicition. Of course, we can establish in an
analogous way that ﬁrm B does not have an atom in (r®;w).
Step 5: There are no atoms at w whenever w < r¯. This statement can be
veriﬁed by mimicking the argument appearing in Step 4, where we only have
to replace wA with w.
Step 6: We can now determine the form of the equilibrium wage distribution
functions on (r®;w] whenever there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
By the previous steps we must have
¼
¤




¹B (fr¯g) + (20)








for all w 2 (r®;w]. Rearranging equations (21) and (20) we can derive (18)
and (19).
Proposition 7 reduces the number of possible atoms to four. Hence, al-
together there are sixteen possible cases. Since both ﬁrms cannot simultane-
ously have atoms at r® by Step 1, the number of cases reduces immediately
to twelve. Going through all these cases only the solution given in the Ap-
pendix survives. In particular, the other cases lead to negative values for the
atoms or to contradictory equations.
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